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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses from a critical perspective the irregularities committed by financial 
institutions in the use of complex techniques to increase liquidity, the commercialization 
of toxic financial products, such as preferred participations or multi-currency 
mortgages, and the bad faith in the commercialization of loans. Firstly we will define 
what we consider as a toxic financial product or toxic behaviour, together with the 
definition of each instrument; followed by the commercialization and the consequences 
on the surroundings; finally, we focus on preventive measures from the institutional 
bodies that are regulating the situation. This leads to conclusions that help us to 
understand the wave of lawsuits filed by retail clients requesting the nullity due to a lack 
of consent in these contracts, based on the lack of information to the customer and the 
repeated failure to comply with MIFID regulations of financial institutions. 
Key words: toxic financial products, preferred participations, ground clause, retail client 
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INTRODUCTION 
The "subprime mortgage crisis" in the United States in the summer of 2007 unchained 
a severe international financial crisis of interbank mistrust, originated from the infection 
of the global system by toxic products and deficiencies in supervision. This crisis has 
stifled the circulation of credit and led to a chain of bankruptcies in the financial system, 
which has finally moved to crisis and recession of the entire international economy. 
In Spain, a crisis was growing up for the exhaustion of the mortgage model developed 
in the last 20 years as the basis of the Spanish economy and exacerbated since 2000 
and characterized because of absolutely speculative and unsustainable. Since 
December 2005, the gradually increase of the interest rates by the European Central 
Bank's has been slowly undermining the ability of Spanish mortgage consumers to 
repay their mortgage loans and caused the crash of the "housing bubble", connected to 
a gradual rise of prices by the change to the euro which has led to serious difficulties 
for many family economies. These facts announced a radical change in the economic 
trends of our country, based on house speculation and financial debt of families and 
companies, and made very serious consequences for the economic stability of many 
families. Millions of consumers have been stuck by debt, mainly mortgage debt, which 
has finally come to a halt the consumption and serious difficulties to reach the end of 
the month. At present there are a large number of families in situations of bankruptcy 
and risk of loss of their home and other assets, as a result of defaults on their mortgage 
payment, both for personal situations (unemployment or other) and for the abusive 
financial conditions in their credits, but so far, actually there are not measures to solve 
these problems. The result of this situation has been that consumers have gone 
through big troubles for the debt, and the real beneficiaries have been the builders, 
banks, savings banks, financial institutions and a multitude of credit companies that 
have made lots of profits in their accounts at the expense of consumers who have 
blame the heavy weight of the crash. 
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OBJECT OF THE PAPER 
The main objective of this work is try to explain to the reader the reasons why the 
financial products sold by financial institutions during the years before the crisis and 
during this, the retail customer don‟t fit in the profile of a small saver. 
The society is aware that the actual financial and economic crisis was caused by the 
mismanagement of financial institutions as in levels, the national and international. If to 
this first impression that maintains the society on the banks and savings banks we add 
the scandals that have been appearing to us to the present time, between which they 
emphasize great amount of entities that through their advice have been seen involved 
in a large number of cases of corruption and fraud, the problem of the sale of toxic 
products or the inclusion, in products as typical as mortgages, of abusive clauses. If we 
put all this together, it results in a lot of actions that have caused great discontent in 
society. 
In addition to the main objective, the following secondary objectives should be: 
1. Try to analyse the fraud or deception by quantifying in data the losses that have 
meant for the families the possession of complex financial products. 
2. Analyse the sentences by the higher justice authorities. Investigate the process used 
by bodies such as the European Supreme Court or the Spanish High Court of Justice 
to determine the sentences, and in most cases establish the reasons why they favour 
to the small saver. 
3. Do an investigation about mortgages, as we see how banks and savings banks have 
focused on these types of loans. In this way it is tried to explain the securitization 
process, and the commercialization of multi-currency mortgages as well as the 
inclusion, unilaterally by the financial entities, of clauses of abusive character. Fact that 
has had immediate consequences, causing the denunciation of a large part of society 
and large number of institutions, both nationally and internationally, have denounced. 
The objective will also be to know the measures taken to try to solve this problem. 
4. Carry out an investigation on preferred participations, since it was also a particularly 
important issue according to the analysis carried out. Analysing the characteristics and 
what has been its commercialization throughout history.  
It will also study the preventive measures adopted by Europe and the CNMV [Comisión 
Nacional del Mercado de Valores] as well as the various alternatives that the investor 
has to try to get rid of them. 
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METHODOLOGY 
The present work is a study about the consequences of the sale of complex financial 
products and bad behaviour by the banking sector to a large fraction of society. 
For the elaboration, I have been considered official reports, such as those of the CNMV 
offered by the Defensor del Pueblo (2013), in relation to the commercialization of 
preferred participations," Study on preferred participations", and the reading of the 
sentences of the superior courts of justice.  
In the other way from these reports, the huge part of the information collected comes 
from the field work. For the accomplishment of this investigation a total of five steps 
were followed, next will be described each one: 
1. Establishing the dates on which the research was focused. These chosen dates 
comprise the period between September 2007 and the end of 2014, since it is a 
sufficiently broad period, as current as possible and due to the great impact of the 
chosen topic. However, a lot of sentences by the Courts against Banks are from 2016-
2017. 
2. Consult economic press, specialized websites in economic and financial matters, law 
firms, or platforms of affected people. 
3. The third step was to review the situation prior to the problem, consulting the press 
and specialized websites in financial markets, to contextualize the before, during and 
after the global economic crisis. 
4. Analysis the collected information and the elaboration of graphs and tables. 
5. The last step consisted of drawing conclusions from the collected information and its 
critical analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
CHAPTER I: TOXICITY IN THE FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK 
To understand the following academic work, we must define what we consider as "toxic 
product" or in the case "toxic asset". Toxic financial products are those that have been 
offered with full guarantees, and for a particular customer. This is not a scam, but a 
product that because of its characteristics, is not suitable for the retail customer, that is, 
the one who as a general rule, doesn‟t have the experience, knowledge and skills 
necessary to make their own investment decisions and to value correctly the inherent 
risks in such decisions. We are faced with the problem, where the financial institution 
sells it to the individual, knowing the risk for their savings because there are referenced 
to variable indexes depending on economic and financial developments.  
However, within this definition we also find unfair business practices carried out by the 
financial institution putting a product or a special feature of a service, in a way that isn‟t 
transparent or inadequate for the client's profile. In this way, although not strictly a 
product the definition encompasses characteristics of a contract, operation, conditions 
of sale, etc...  
On the other hand, according to the digital newspaper Expansion (n.d.) a "toxic asset" 
identifies a type of asset of poor quality, that is, with a lot of risk as to the probability of 
recovering the initial value, and, therefore, has a very bad rating or subprime,; this 
expression that has become popular in the financial markets in the aftermath of the 
subprime crisis. 
The problem for financial institutions is to have on their balance sheets a very high 
percentage of this type of damaged assets, which can generate large losses and place 
them in very difficult situations to settle, which has caused governments of a lot of 
countries to look for different measures to favour the liquidity of the financial institutions 
that are in this situation. 
The origin of these toxic assets it is entered in a poor analysis of client risk or over-
expansive risk-granting policies, allowing to lending to people most likely to become 
insolvent. If this is accompanied by the fall of the value of the assets that guarantee the 
debt in the first place, the consequence is that toxic asset, whose value has decreased 
a lot, and is difficult to sell in turn to make it liquid, even obtaining losses. 
The financial entities that have carried out this policy are found with a large number of 
assets that, once the borrower is unpaid, are not worth the loan that was granted for its 
acquisition. Therefore, any action that damages the retail client by the financial 
institution and that has been made on the basis of the good will and responsibility of 
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the bank will be treated inappropriate behaviour in favour of the interests of a single 
party, fostering a toxic relationship between the client and the financial institution. 
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CHAPTER II: ANALYSIS OF MOST COMMON TOXIC TECHNIQUES, PRODUCTS 
AND BAD FAITH IN FINANCE 
At continuation, there are defined and analysed the main toxic financial techniques and 
products that are the most sold and popular in the media. The analysis is done through 
the study of profitability and risk. Product risk is determined by market risk and credit 
risk, but also by other aspects such as product complexity and liquidity. Also, there are 
included the conditions and characteristics of the products or services.  And finally, we 
discuss of the consequences of the sale of toxic products to retail customers. 
1. Securitization 
1.1 Definition 
Asset securitization is defined as a process that allows the transformation of a group of 
liquid assets into a series of negotiable instruments, liquid and with certain payment 
flows. This process can be carried out by any company, although it is usually used by 
the credit institutions because of its capacity to generate numerous financial assets. In 
this way, the securitization allows the transformation of heterogeneous assets in liquid 
securities homogenous, of greater value and susceptible of being sold, transferred or 
ceded to a third party (Catarienu and Pérez, 2008). 
The securitization process is done by creating a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which 
is the one that issues the securities in the market. For this reason, the credit quality of 
the securities issued by the financial vehicle is directly linked to the credit risk of the 
underlying portfolio, thus dissociating itself from the credit quality of the originator of the 
loans. 
The important role of the securitization process in recent years was because this 
process provides a financing mechanism to the credit institutions, while contributions to 
the financial markets and the growth of the credit. 
One of the most common classifications of structured banking products is elaborated 
by the European Securitization Forum (2008), which includes the following products: 
Asset Backed Securities (ABS), Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), Mortgage 
Backed Securities (MBS) and Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS). Next, 
we briefly define each one. 
- Asset Backed Security (ABS). An ABS is a bond whose cash flow is generated by a 
portfolio of financial assets normally shorter term. Included in this classification are 
credit cards, leases, car loans, bills of exchange or promissory notes. In order to 
achieve a longer term in the amortization of an ABS, the structure of this type of 
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product usually includes an initial revolving period (between one and three years), 
where the principal amortized of the portfolio is reinvested in the purchase of new 
financial assets instead of repaying the bond issued, provided that the securitized 
portfolio presents a correct evolution with respect to the level of defaults and other 
selected parameters. 
- Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO). A CDO is a equity whose cash flows are 
backed by a set of bonds, loans or other type of assets. CDOs do not specialize in any 
kind of debt, and may consist of a large number of financial assets of diverse nature 
such as, for example, bonds, loans or ABS. If the title created has as underlying asset 
a set of bonds of high yield, classified as "junk bonds" or below investment grade, is 
called Collateralized Bond Obligation (CBO). 
- Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS). A MBS is a mortgage bond similar in structure to 
a CDO, although in this case the set of underlying assets is composed entirely of 
mortgage loans. These issues are used by the mortgage lenders in order to obtain a 
large part of the cash flows of the mortgages, since otherwise they would receive them 
in a long period of time higher. 
1.2 Profitability and risk  
As Eva Catarineu and Daniel Perez (2008) said in a publication, for the Bank of Spain 
despite the strong growth that the asset securitization market has experienced in 
recent times, it is still not enough the main reason why a financial institution decides to 
securitise. While the asset securitization process can help increase the liquidity and 
commission income, to reduce the risk of credit and interest rates, and to improve 
leverage ratios, there are many financial institutions that have not yet securitized their 
assets. Among the disadvantages of securitization of assets, there are the reductions 
in the saving of the taxes on the debt, which remains on the balance sheet, as well as 
the costs involved in the creation of the financial vehicle. 
The most common classification distinguishes securitization operations taking into 
account the main motive on the part of the asset originator to carry out this 
securitization, distinguishing three main causes or effects: 
a) Liquidity or search for new financing alternatives. 
b) Transfer of credit risk. In turn, the securitization process serves to a greater or lesser 
extent as a transfer mechanism of the risk. Several authors point out that the 
securitization technique is used as a more efficient mechanism of transfer of risk and 
obtaining of liquidity. 
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c) The arbitration of regulatory capital. The entities have resorted to the use of the 
securitization technique with a view to reduce capital requirements. 
On the other hand, it should be taken into account that when financial institutions 
transfer a set of mortgage loans to a securitization fund, taking them off the assets of 
their balance sheet, they are transferring to the buyers or investors of those securities 
all the risks involved the possession of mortgage loans in your portfolio investment. In 
addition, the investor of the securitization bonds will have to support another series of 
risks related to the structure of the operation, although the degree of subordination 
chosen by this one counts in greater or lower the risk assumed. 
In summary, the main risks faced by investors of this type of assets are those derived 
from the defaults produced in the underlying loan portfolio, changes in interest rates, 
the risk of early repayment, the risk of insolvency, the risk management of cash flow 
and custody, border risk and taxation, and of liquidity risk. 
1.3 Commercialization  
The conditions and distribution channels of the securitized assets differed in the US 
and European markets. The lack of regulation in the American subprime mortgage 
market resulted in the mortgage crisis beginning in the summer of 2007. These loans - 
granted to borrowers with low credit quality and, therefore, with an implied higher risk - 
grew to represent a very significant part of the total volume of loans originated in United 
States. (BBVA, 2017) 
However, as announced by the European Mortgage Federation (El Mundo, 2009), it 
is not possible to establish parallels between the US and Spanish securitization 
markets, so a comparison of their commercialization would not be correct. One of the 
fundamental differences with the North American model lies in the development of 
different models of securitization, that is, in the model of origin to distribute 
characteristic of the American market, compared to the model of origin to maintain 
typical of the Spanish market. (De Aguinada, 2010) 
The differences are that in the United States, where the issuance of subprime MBS 
achieves the total transfer of risk - thus freeing the entire consumption of capital and 
the appearance on the balance sheet - and in Spain the use of the securitization 
technique has been mainly used as a financing mechanism, so off-balance sheet 
securitization only accounts for between 6% and 7% of total operations (BBVA, 2008). 
Therefore, although the crisis originated in the US subprime securitization market, the 
common nexus between the two markets was to form a portfolio with a low credit 
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quality, so if it depends directly on variables such as the characteristics of the borrower 
and/or the amount to be financed. Thus, if the borrowers are of low credit quality or if 
the assumed debt accounts for a large part of the disposable income, a higher level of 
default in the portfolio is expected to be transmitted to the financing instruments. 
In this way, as Krugman (2007) concludes the problem of the credit crisis of the last 
years of growth of the "great real estate cycle", banks originated a large number of 
loans of doubtful credit quality, being fully aware of what they were doing, the ball 
through the securitization of subprime mortgages. 
1.4 The fraud of securitization  
As we have seen, the origin of the financial crisis lies in high risk mortgages, known in 
the United States as subprime. This was a special type of mortgage, preferably used 
for the acquisition of housing, and aimed at customers with poor solvency and 
therefore with a level of risk of default higher than the average of other loans. Their 
interest rate was higher than in personal loans (although the early years had a 
promotional interest rate), and bank charges were more onerous. US banks had a limit 
to the granting of such loans, imposed by the Federal Reserve (Novales, 2010). As we 
can see at the figure 1 in 2006, 600$ billion of subprime loans were originated, most of 
wich were securitized. That year, subprime lending accounted for 23.5% of all 
mortgage originations. 
Figure 1. Subprime Originations  
 
Source: Subprime Mortgage Originations, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commissions 
(2011) 
10 
 
Since the debt can be sold and traded through the purchase of bonds or credit 
securitizations, subprime mortgages could be withdrawn from the balance sheet of the 
concessionaire and transferred to investment funds or pension plans. Thanks to this 
operation, a NINJA Loan could be granted to a nickname for very low quality subprime 
loans as described in No Income, No Job, (and) no Assets and is a term used in the 
United States mortgage industry to describe one of many documentation types which 
lenders may allow when underwriting a mortgage. The banks granted these loans to 
the ninjas with the expectation that the real estate market would continue to rise, since 
if the client declared insolvent, the sale of the house allowed the bank to earn the 
difference between the borrowed capital and the price of the sale. (Toca, 2009) 
However, due to the connection of the global economy and the circulation of financial 
capital, financing between US banks and the rest of the world was done through 
portfolios incorporating subprime mortgages. In this way, when the housing bubble 
burst, all banks were affected by having subprime mortgage loans on their balance 
sheets of people who could not cope with the initial debt. So when the value of housing 
fallen, all the mortgages stock in the balance sheet of the entities caused a domino 
effect of losses. 
As shown in the chart below, the INE (2013) in June 2007 reached the maximum peak 
in the price of housing; After 6 years, in June 2013, housing had fallen by 35% .2 3 By 
the end of 2013 the price of housing would have accumulated a fall of 45%. Spain was 
the country in the world where the price of housing fell the most. The third quarter of 
2013 the value of the flats in Spain fell 9.46% compared to the third quarter of 2012.  
Figure 2. Evolution of housing price
 
Source: Evolution of housing price in Spain, INE (2012) 
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2. Preferred participations 
2.1 Definition 
Although it is not easy to draw a clear profile of preferred participations, according to 
the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (n.d.), preferred participations (PPR) 
are financial instruments issued by a company that do not confer participation in its 
capital or right to vote. They have a perpetual character and their profitability, generally 
of variable character, is not guaranteed. 
The characteristics of the preferred participations are: 
A) No guarantee political rights to the investor. 
 B) The remuneration agreed as payment of interest is conditioned to the obtaining of 
benefits. 
C) They are instruments without determined expiration date.  
D) The investor is preferred over the shareholder in case of bankruptcy of the 
company. In the savings banks that did not issue participative quotas, if the insolvency 
of the entity occurs, the preferred participations have no privilege whatsoever. 
In this way, we can classify them as hybrid instruments because they can‟t be 
considered shares as they do not have intrinsic political rights, nor as treasury bonds, 
and without determined expiration date. 
In addition, the preferred participations aren‟t quoted on the stock exchange. It is a 
financial instrument that is quoted on the in organized exchange, so it can be obtained 
in both, the primary and secondary market. Its issue is represented by account entries 
The incurred costs can significantly affect the investment as: commissions in favour of 
the financial institution, commissions by intermediaries, or administration and custody 
costs. 
2.2 Profitability and risk 
The preferred participations are a complex instrument that poses a high risk, you 
required high financial skills to operate with certain safety. This aspect was omitted by 
banks that sold them to the retail customer causing huge losses, after signing without 
being fully aware of the consequences they could bear to own a product of such 
characteristics. 
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In terms of profitability, PRPs provide a fixed remuneration for a short period of time 
and variable for the rest of the product's life until the expiration date, usually referenced 
to the EURIBOR plus a spread. Therefore, the situation in the market during the period 
of the variable remuneration, can lead to losses for the possessor of the preferred, if 
we are in uncertainty terms. The analysis of the markets will be carried out in the 
following sections. 
In addition, based on Law 13/1985 Investment factors, own resources and 
information obligations of financial intermediaries (1985), dated May 25, on, "the 
payment of this remuneration shall be conditional upon the existence of profits or 
distributable reserve in broadcasting entity or dominant" and is not cumulative, so that if 
it is not perceived in a period, the investor loses the right to receive it. On the other 
hand, "in cases where the broadcasting entity or parent company, or its consolidable 
group or subgroup, has significant accounting losses or a significant drop in the ratios 
of the shareholder‟s equity  requirements, preference participations shall establish a 
mechanism to ensure the participation of its possessors in the absorption of current or 
future losses ... " which implies that the company establishes the possessor of the 
preferred participation one behind the creditors, and ahead of the ordinary shares in 
the moment of bankruptcy proceeding. 
2.3 Commercialization 
As a study carried out on preferred participations (Defensor Del Pueblo, 2013) points 
out, the problem of preferred participations has been the form of commercialization by 
credit institutions. Most financial institutions have placed a large part of their preferred 
participations among their retail customers, who had their savings insured in fixed-term 
deposits within the entity and had a conservative risk profile. For this, the bank entity 
assured that preferred participations were instruments with a higher income than any 
deposit and with an absolute liquidity for the acquirer. But they did not explain to them 
that they are complex financial instruments, high risk, are not covered by any 
guarantee fund, without an expiration date and for sale they have to go to a secondary 
market that does not have immediate liquidity. Citizens have been aware of the true 
nature of the contracted product once they have requested the disposition of the 
money deposited, when they began to suffer losses or ceased to receive interest. 
2.3.1. Period until 2008 
Prior to 2008, the nominal value of the preferred participations coincided with their 
market or sale value, with most of the preference placements indistinctly between 
institutional and retail investors. In 2005 the CNMV sent a letter to the issuers, which 
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recommended that at least 10% of the issue be allocated to the institutional tranche, or 
that in order to determine the financial conditions, two reports or any other mechanism 
that the issue terms were market conditions. In this period, it was a frequent practice 
among the entities, depending on the issue and duration, the early amortization, so that 
the investor recovered 100 per cent of his investment plus the interest received. 
Another practice of the entities was the repurchase of the participation, when the client 
requested, at 100 per cent of the nominal and sold to another customer for that price. 
They also facilitated the line up to 100% of the nominal among customers interested in 
selling or buying in the own branch office or network of the entity, communicating these 
cases later to the regulated market AIAF5. In summary, until the end of 2008 investors 
were able to recover their capital without difficulty. 
2.3.2. Period since 2008 
As of 2008, with the entry into force of the new Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID), explained in detail in chapter V, states in detail a rules introduced for 
the classification and rating of products and the subsequent commercialization of the 
same. In this way, the entities had to pass to qualify the preferred participations like 
complex products. Therefore, the entity is obliged to carry out a test on the financial 
knowledge and experience of the investor and, if necessary, must advise the clients 
before the commercialization of their lack of knowledge and experience (non-
convenience advice). The entities that provide the services of reception, transmission 
or execution of orders on complex instruments by account of their clients should 
request information on their knowledge and experience, in order to evaluate if the 
service or product is suitable for the client. This doesn‟t mean as an increase in its 
protection, but rather seeks to give the investor more information, without preventing 
the latter from finally hiring the product when it deems it appropriate. In addition, the 
entity must make available to the investor, who buys this product, a triptych / summary 
of the prospectus of the issue in order to be informed about the risks of the product to 
be acquired. It includes the characteristics of the product: perpetuity, conditional 
remuneration on the existence of profits and fluctuation in the nominal value, which 
could lead to losses in its sale. As of 2008, institutional investors stopped mattering in 
the purchase of this type of products; as a result, the entities increased the 
commercialization of preferred participations among the retail clientele. In response to 
this trend, the CNMV (2009), in the scope of activity about the protection of the 
investor, communicates to entities issuing fixed income products (preferred 
participations and subordinated debt, among others) that if these are only traded 
between retailers investors should include a valuation report from an independent 
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expert in order to determine whether the conditions of issuance to retailers are 
comparable to those which a similar issue launched on the wholesale market. The 
CNMV included an advise in the prospectus in the case that the price of the final 
valuation offered by the issuer, was different from the price of the valuation report. On 
the other hand, the economic situation in general and in particular of the  financial 
institutions, starts to move away the market value of the nominal of some preferred 
participations. The National Commission on Securities Market itself announced to the 
preference issuers that it is malpractice to carry out buy-sell transactions between retail 
investors at nominal value, if this is different from the market value, since, in the case 
of transactions above of the market value, the investor acquiring the securities is being 
harmed. 
2.4 The fraud of the Preferred Participations 
The bank fraud that presents the scam of the preferred participations in Spain goes 
back to the decade of the 90, although it was during the economic crisis next to the 
housing bubble where they reached the highest number of preferred participations 
placed between the retail clients, without knowing the risks which implied neither the 
characteristics of the product.       
As Llamas (2014) argues, banks offered preferred participations to private investors 
without financial knowledge. The swindle carried out by the banks was to imply that it 
was a fixed income instrument, which provided the profitability of a variable, but with 
the security and risk of fixed income products. However, due to the lack of 
transparency and the complexity of the product, it has led the clients to report the 
practices carried out by the bank. These entities had to carry out a test on the financial 
knowledge and experience of the investor and, if appropriate, must advise the clients 
before the commercialization of their lack of knowledge and experience (non-
convenience advice). The entities that provide the services of reception, transmission 
or execution of orders on complex instruments on behalf of their clients should request 
information on their knowledge and experience, in order to evaluate whether the 
service or product is suitable for the client. This does not imply an increase in its 
protection, but rather seeks to give the investor more information, without preventing 
the latter from finally hiring the product when it deems it appropriate 
As of 2008, institutional investors stopped mattering in the purchase of this type of 
products, as a result of which the entities increased the commercialization of preferred 
participations among the retail clientele. The increase in the supply by banks and 
savings banks of this type of products during the years 2008-2014 was born from the 
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need to increase capital to cover the risks assumed in the face of the crisis. In May 
2011, the outstanding balance of preferred stock was 29,713 million euros held by 
retailers, of which approximately 75% corresponded to credit institutions (about 22,000 
million) and about 7,000 million to non-financial entities. 
Figure 3. Preferred participations  
GROUP 
PREFERRED PARTICIPATIONS 
(Millions €)  
La Caixa 4898 
Bankia 388 
BBVA 3475 
Banco Santander 1966 
Nova Caixa Galicia 903 
Mare Nostrum 942 
CAM 1310 
Caixa Catalunya 480 
Banca Civica 9043 
Caja España de Inversiones 412 
Banco Sabadell 850 
Banco Popular 878 
EFFibank 178 
Ibercaja 0 
Banesto 497 
Bankinter 343 
Unnim 173 
Caja 3 0 
Banco Pastor   250 
Deutsche Bank 0 
BBK Bank Cajasur 150 
Caixa Ontinyent 0 
Banco Etcheverria 0 
TOTAL ISSUES 22374 
Source: Own elaboration based on the study by Defensor del Pueblo, 2013 
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3. Ground clauses 
3.1 Definition 
According to the definition provided by the website CrediMarket (2017) dedicated to 
provide information on possible financial products or services offered by banks, savings 
banks or credit institutions, this is a clause that establishes a minimum to pay in the 
instalments of the mortgage although the ordinary interest that has been agreed with 
the entity is below. Most mortgages in Spain have an interest rate referenced to the 
EURIBOR plus a spread. Therefore, the ground of the mortgage will be the one that 
sets a minimum percentage although the interest arising from the sum of the EURIBOR 
plus the differential is lower. 
3.2 Profitability and risk 
To explain the profitability and risk provided by the clauses we will take as an example 
a mortgage to EURIBOR + 1, which has the interest of the EURIBOR and an extra 
point in interest rates. This index is reviewed annually, and is the one that affects the 
payment of the monthly instalments according to theirs value. 
Faced with the fluctuation of this value, many mortgages incorporated ground and roof 
clauses, which functioned as maximum and minimum. The question is, that the 
EURIBOR reached the highest points of the decade in 2008 and the lowest in 2009. 
This meant that with the EURIBOR surpassing 5%, those mortgages to EURIBOR + 1 
the debtors were paying 6% of interest. However, the roof clauses didn‟t get activated 
since the entities had fixed on 13% average. 
On the other hand, in 2009, people who owned a mortgage with ground clauses 
stopped to see their instalments go down. This was because, although the EURIBOR 
would be set at 1%, the clause was set at 2% to 3%, a percentage that was not difficult 
to reach, especially in comparison with the roof clauses. 
3.3 Commercialization 
These clauses are within a legal context when included in the contract signed by the 
client, but for this must have been agreed by all parties that make up the mortgage 
contract. The ground and roof clauses were incorporated in the deeds that formalized 
the mortgage under the names or headings: limits to the application of variable interest, 
limits of variability, and variable interest rates. 
At present, there are a large number of court decisions that cancel mortgage contracts 
because there is no apparent agreement between the signatory parties when 
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establishing such clauses. All this, at the end, is a benefit for the bank and a detriment 
to the client against the fluctuations of the reference index.  
3.4 Fraud of ground clauses 
During the period when the housing bubble was created, in Spain the mortgages that 
were subscribed at a variable interest rate referenced to the EURIBOR plus a spread. 
As described in the previous paragraphs, the operation of this index was based on a 
fixed minimum that although the EURIBOR plus the differential would be reduced 
would pay the minimum interest set, ie, the real decline in interest rates. 
This is not operating outside the law, as the Bank of Spain and the Spanish Mortgage 
Law permit it. However, there is talk of fraud because financial institutions did not duly 
report their presence, and the consequences that could entail. 
It is estimated that the amount defrauded by banks would amount to 4,000 million 
euros according to data from the Bank of Spain and would affect about 3.3 million 
Spaniards (Publico, 2016). In December 2016, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
forced to apply total retroactivity to the ground clauses. That is, it obliges to return to 
the entities everything collected from the beginning of the application of these 
conditions if the contracts were abusive (Rincón, 2017). However, a new sentence in 
April this year issued by the Spanish Supreme Court estimated that it will not review 
sentences about abusive ground clauses issued prior to the December  European 
Court of Justice sentence. This is a victory for entities - first BBVA, Abanca y Cajamar, 
and later Popular -, who will not have to return the money improperly collected before 
the date of the court's first sentence, May 9, 2013 (Segovia, 2017) 
This pronouncement by the Supreme Court is due to a cassation appeal filed by the 
Association of Users of Banking Services (AUSBANC) in court. This ends a long 
process that saw its first sentence on September 30, 2010, when the Mercantile Court 
No. 2 of Seville condemned BBVA, Cajamar and Caixa Galicia to eliminate, for 
abusive, such clauses of the contracts issued and to refrain from use them in the 
future. This judgment understood that it was an abusive clause, because it is a 
condition generally incorporated by the bank to mortgage loans, without possibility of 
negotiation with the client. The main argument about this type of practice is that it 
transgresses the principles of good faith, to the detriment of the customer, causing a 
significant imbalance in consumer economies. And this ground clause has been the 
main responsible for the progressive reduction of the reference rate in variable rate 
mortgages (in the case of Spain, the EURIBOR) was not reflected in a generalized fall 
in monthly instalments payable by the holders of the mortgages. AUSBANC was the 
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first association to detect this bad banking practice and has raised numerous demands 
for this clause to be declared abusive and removed from the contracts. At the moment, 
more than fifty favourable judgments have already been detected. 
In the lower graph, we can the estimate value that people with ground clauses in their 
mortgages can achieve with the total retroactivity of the clause or since May 2013 
when Spanish Supreme Court considered the ground clauses abusive.  
Figure 4. Ground clauses 
ENTITIES 
Value with total 
retroactivity 
Value without 
total retroactivity 
(since May 2013) 
ABANCA 10.000-13.000€ 4000-7000€ 
BANKIA 10.000-13.000€ 4000-7000€ 
BBVA 10.000-13.000€ 4000-7000€ 
BMN 13000-16000€ 7000-10000€ 
CAIXABANK 10.000-13.000€ 4000-7000€ 
CAJAMAR 10000-13000€ 4000-7000€ 
IBERCAJA 13000-16000€ 7000-10000€ 
KUTABANK 13000-16000€ 7000-10000€ 
LIBERBANK 13000-16000€ 7000-10000€ 
POPULAR 13000-16000€ 7000-10000€ 
SABADELL 13000-16000€ 7000-10000€ 
SANTANDER 4000-7000€ 600-4000€ 
UNICAJA 13000-16000€ 7000-10000€ 
Source: YVANCO&ABOGADOS, 2017 
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4. Multi-currency Mortgage 
4.1 Definition 
A multi-currency mortgage is a type of loan that allows the payment in another, 
currency different  than the Euro (dollar, yen, pound, etc...) according to the judgment 
of the Supreme Court on Act June 30 (2015) . The Plenary estimate that” it‟s a 
derivative financial instrument in that the quantification of the obligation of one of the 
parties in the contract depends on the amount that reaches a different value, called the 
underlying asset, which is a foreign currency. As a derivative financial instrument 
related to foreign exchange, it is included in the scope of the Securities Market Law in 
accordance with the provisions of art. 2.2 of the law, and is a complex financial 
instrument under the provisions of art. 79.bis.8 of the Securities Market Law, in relation 
to art. 2.2 of the law." 
4.2 Profitability and risk 
The main advantage of the multi-currency mortgage was to reduce the interest rate 
against a negative variation of the currency against the euro. With this, a fall of the 
currency against the euro benefited to him, and a positive variation prejudiced to him. 
The profitability that could be obtained when granting a mortgage in another currency, 
was the interest rates so low that they had currencies like the yen or the Swiss franc. 
However, during the years in which the global economic and financial crisis erupted, 
connected with the strong volatility of the exchange rate markets, the euro fell against 
the currency, leading to a fall in house prices, but at the same time derive on a rise in 
the amount to reimburse. In this way, the client who couldn‟t pay the instalments lost 
the house, obligate to return the money to the bank for most of the loan received, 
because consumers were not warned that not only was the monthly instalment 
recalculated, otherwise also,  the capital outstanding. 
The lower graph made by the ASUFIN (2016) [Asociación de Usuarios Financieros] 
shows the difference between the evolutions of a loan contracted in January 2008 for 
200,000 euros indexed to yen or Swiss francs against a traditional loan in euros. Thus, 
we note that at the end of 2016 the customer's mortgage in euros is reduced to 
150,000 euros, but the outstanding debt for those with yen mortgages amounts to 
almost 300,000 euros, and more than 280,000 euros for those who they had it in Swiss 
francs.  
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Figure 5. Multi-currency mortgage 
Source: Economic impact of a multi-currency mortgage, ASUFIN (2016)  
4.3 Commercialization 
Multi-currency mortgages are a financial hybrid that combines a mortgage loan with a 
derivative. In this type of product, the client contracts the mortgage in euros but the 
instalments and the amount to be repaid are recalculated periodically in the chosen 
currency, whether yen, Swiss francs or other currencies. The client mortgages his 
home as collateral for repayment of a loan whose amount would varies continuously in 
the margin of the value of the home.  
Figure 6. Multi-currency mortgages commercialization 
 
Source: Multi-currency mortgages commercialization, ASUFIN (2016) 
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In the previous graph classify the 160 resolutions by financial institutions. It notes 
clearly that with 34%, Bankinter is the entity that most multi-currency mortgages has 
commercialized; followed by Barclays with 18%Caixa Cataluña with 17% and behind, 
Banco Popular, with 11%. Also we can find smaller commercialization of multi-currency 
mortgages in entities such as Santander, Kutxabank or Banco de Valencia.  
4.4 Fraud of Multi-currency Mortgages 
Owing to the abuses suffered by the retail client requesting a loan with these 
characteristics without financial knowledge, the Supreme Court as we have seen 
previously, has been pronounced considering that we are dealing with a derivative and 
complex instrument that is applied by the MIFID regulation in catch to the investor. 
Although this regulation will be described in more detail in the following sections, 
roughly requires banks to assess the knowledge and experience in the financial 
markets before offering the multi-currency mortgage, or if appropriate, a product 
appropriate to their profile. 
According to the report of the ASUFIN (2016) in Spain it is estimated that there are 
70,000 multi-currency loans, of which about 46% is indexed in yen, 52% in Swiss 
francs and the rest in pounds and dollars. In addition, ASUFIN estimates that the 
entities could have placed more than 14,000 million euros indexed in other currencies. 
During the last years, a number of judgments have been a key in order to be able to 
declare the total or partial nullity of the multi-currency mortgage agreement (ECJ 26/13, 
2014), Supreme Court decision 303/2015 June qualifies multi-currency mortgages as a 
loan plus a financial derivative and, with it, the application of the Securities Market Law 
(MIFID). Finally, the European Court of Justice ruled again (ECJ C312-14, 2015) with a 
judgment in which it considers that in the specific case of Litis we are not dealing with a 
more financial derivative loan, leaving National Court to determine if could be. This new 
sentence are great news for Spanish consumers of mortgages, as they can be 
released from these unfair and abusive terms that were imposed by banks without prior 
negotiation with the client and that blocked the mortgage payments reflect the declines 
in mortgage reference rates such as the EURIBOR. 
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5. Miscellaneous  
5.1 Case of Bernard Madoff 
Bernard Madoff's fraud consisted of taking capital in exchange for large profits that 
were effective at first, but later revealed to be a pyramid scheme or Ponzi scheme. 
Victims of Madoff, with philanthropic reputation, were both banking entities and investor 
groups, some foundations and charitable organizations, mainly from the Jewish 
community of the USA, were also victims of its scam. Bernard Madoff fraud is 
estimated in 50.000 million dollars. (Badía, 2008)  
 5.2 Fraud in bank accounting 
The legislation of the different countries usually guarantees deposits up to an amount, 
for it requires contributions from banks, insurance, a cash ratio (available liquid money 
also called legal reserve coefficient, and reserve ratio) and accounting transparency, 
but in sometimes a bank misrepresents its accounts and issues shares and shares and 
deposits with falsified accounting figures or manipulated legal reserve ratio. 
The cases of Bankia (former Caja Madrid) and many other Spanish savings banks 
broken by their bad management forced a process of mergers and mergers with huge 
public aid to clean up the balance sheets broken by the Spanish real estate bubble and 
the consequent Spanish real estate crisis 2008 -2013. Bankia has needed 147 billion 
euros in its rescue. (El País, 2014) 
5.3 Fraud due to tax evasion and money laundering covered by bank secrecy 
These frauds do not harm banks because it allows them to get deposits - whether legal 
or not - protected by bank secrecy. The damage is usually for the countries where the 
crime is committed that do not receive taxes. The Lagarde list, the Falciani list (Hervé 
Falciani) and the Swiss Leaks have highlighted the generalization of financial crime 
and tax evasion with the protection of banks and sometimes, as in the case of 
Luxembourg or Lux leaks Leaks-, of the governments. (El País, 2017) 
 List Lagarde  
The Lagarde list contains the names of some 2000 potential tax evaders with 
undeclared accounts at the Swiss bank HSBC in Geneva. The list is a small part of the 
Falciani list. 
 
 
23 
 
 List Falciani  
The Falciani list contains more than 130 000 tax evaders that Hervé Falciani took from 
the Swiss subsidiary of the HSBC bank and has served in several countries to uncover 
cases of tax evasion in countries around the world.  
 Swiss Leaks  
Swiss Leaks is a leak in 2015 of one of the best known frauds that would affect the 
British multinational HSBC through Swiss subsidiary HSBC Private Bank (Suisse). 
5.4 Implication of banking in dirty business 
A report from SETEM (2011) analyses economic and financial relationships between 
Spanish banking groups (including their subsidiaries) and controversial arms producers 
since January 2006. The research focuses on the 30 companies whose involvement 
and participation in the production and maintenance of controversial weapons is 
known: cluster munitions, nuclear weapons, anti-personnel mines, depleted uranium 
weapons and biological and chemical weapons. 
On the other hand, we also find a report by Friends of the Earth Europe (2012) which 
analyses the activities of 29 European banks, pension funds and insurance companies, 
including Deutsche Bank, Barclays, RBS, Allianz, BNP Paribas, AXA, HSBC, Generali, 
Allianz, Unicredit and Credit Agricole. It reveals the significant involvement of these 
financial institutions in food speculation, and the direct or indirect financing of land 
grabbing. 
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CHAPTER III: ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND EVOLUTION OF FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 
In this chapter we briefly discuss the current economic environment that has facilitated 
irresponsible behaviour on the part of financial institutions and the negative 
consequences of market developments on financial products owned by retail 
customers. 
1. Economic environment 
To understand the economic crisis we have to go back to 2008. It originated in the 
United States financial markets, beginning with the sale of so-called "toxic assets", and 
continuing with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The panic generated by the 
collapse of this entity considered too big to fall affected the global financial system and 
thus ended up spreading throughout Europe, mainly in peripheral countries, especially 
in the Mediterranean. The functioning of the financial system has been the main 
problem of the crisis and with the intention of solving it and transforming it into an 
efficient system a restructuring has been carried out, modifying the laws that regulate 
and supervise financial institutions. 
Although the US is at the epicentre of the crisis, Spain has been one of the most 
punished countries by the crisis, since the country's macroeconomic and financial 
imbalances have increased; excessive indebtedness, loss of competitiveness and 
confidence, and unsustainable increase in unemployment rates led to negative 
perspectives on the future of the Spanish economy. 
In this way, once the crisis has spread through the Spanish banking system, a lack of 
liquidity on the part of the banks led the entities to consider selling toxic financial 
products to the retail client without financial knowledge. The use of this type of products 
by financial institutions served as a way to find financing cheaply when markets began 
to close after the fall of Lehman Brothers in the United States. 
2. Evolution of financial markets 
To analyse the evolution of the markets and to get an idea of the direct consequences 
of the financial crisis on these, the variations of the index, exchange rates and interests 
will be exposed. 
During 2008, financial markets plummeted causing the biggest declines in their history 
according to Expansion (2008). Under the data available at the close, the Dow Jones, 
the most important Wall Street index, fell 777.68 points (6.98%), to 10,394.92 units. 
The Stock Exchange did not drop many points since September 17, 2001, the day of 
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the reopening of markets after the terrorist attacks of September 11 (9/11), which 
dropped 684.81 points (-7.13%). 
The nervousness spread to Europe, where the trading floor extended their falls by 
more than 5%. The Ibex was one of the best unemployed in the continent with a 
decrease of 3.88%. Meanwhile, the Paris Cac 40 index plunged more than 5% and 
recorded its lowest level since 2005. Very similar situation lived both the London FTSE 
and the German Dax, which were left 5% and 4.2% , Respectively, driven by fears 
about the situation of the financial sector. 
However in the Spanish case during the period, the Ibex-35 fell 39.4% during 2008, the 
biggest fall in history, losing almost 6,000 points. In 2009 it rose near 3,000 points, and 
from 2010 began a steady decline, reaching 7,763 basis points at the end of the 
second quarter of 2013 Gance, 2008). 
However the foreign exchange market, as noted by Alcalde Gutierrez, Calvo 
Bernardino and Paúls Gutiérrez (2014) has continued to show its strength since, 
despite the economic and financial crisis, it has achieved in this triennium a growth of 
more than 35%. The US dollar remains the main reference currency, accounting for 
87% of the world's foreign exchange transactions, followed by the euro and the yen 
with a share of 33.4 and 23% respectively. Although, it should be noted that the first 
and the last have improved their relative importance in the last triennium to the 
detriment of the euro, mainly due to the sovereign debt crisis experienced since 2010 
by some European countries, which introduced a high degree of uncertainty with 
respect to the Eurozone and its possible rupture. Secondly, the most traded currency 
pairs are the dollar against the euro with more than 24% of the exchange rate and the 
US dollar against the yen (18.3% of transactions). Thirdly, on the basis of the produced 
transactions, the greater importance of swaps is maintained, although spot transactions 
have substantially approached the previous ones, being the ones that contributed the 
most to the total market growth (40.6%). Fourth, operations in which the other financial 
institutions act as counterparties have continued to grow in importance. Cross-border 
operations also predominate, accounting for almost 58% of the market. 
The peaks that the value of the common currency from that year draws the deep 
financial crisis caused by the collapse of Lehman Brothers (September 2008), which 
revitalizes the strength of the euro, to which investors seek refuge, and the decision of 
the Federal Reserve of the United States to reduce the interest rate to a historic low of 
0.25%. 
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As we can see in the graph below, at the end of 2009, with the beginning of the 
Eurozone debt crisis, the euro weakened in all areas. It is time for the ECB and its 
monetary policy to save the euro to come to the fore in order to revive the economy. 
The solution was, a reduction of interest rates to the record mark of 0.05% (November 
2011) and the launch of its 'Quantitative Easing' (QE) program in March 2015. The 
euro, as of 2011 begins to weaken, until approaching the parity at the end of 2015. In 
its last value, the euro is changed by 1, 09 dollars. 
Figure 7. Exchange EUR/USD  
 
Source: Historical rates (Fxtop, 2017) 
 
In this way the European currency, the euro, is approaching day to day to parity with 
the dollar in the face of the possibility of rate increases by the US Federal Reserve. 
The euro has fallen in a few months around 0.03%. As can be seen, the European 
currency has been higher than the US since the end of 2002 and in 2008 it reached 
almost US $ 1.60. 
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CHAPTER IV: CONSEQUENCES ON THE RETAIL CLIENT 
This chapter will attempt to quantify the consequences on the retail customer following 
the evolution of markets. The possession of complex products has generated losses in 
the families causing some of them to become homeless, under the poverty thresholds 
and in debt to a capacity superior to the one of their purchasing power. 
5.1 Families and indebtedness 
According to the Ruling of the Consumers and Users Board on the indebtedness 
of families (2009), the main cause of debts in families is the mortgage loan. This puts 
us at the top of the international ranking of family indebtedness, and has reached such 
level of seriousness that the threat of seizure of housing, payrolls and other assets of 
families, is hovering over hundreds of thousands of consumers. Family debt has 
systematically grown above income in recent years, so the ratio between the two 
variables has grown from 45% in 1995 or 76.7% in 2001, to over 140% in 2008. 
Data on family encumbrance, particularly the extremely increase in the level of 
indebtedness between 1996 and 2008, especially since 2003, are closely linked in the 
current situation with the fact that default have tripled in a year, reaching 3.8% and 
predicted to reach 6 or 7% in 2009. The latest analysis and datum already speak of 
more than 100,000 families in mortgages foreclosure proceedings, figures that may 
double in the coming years according to almost all analysts.  
In 2012, according to the Bank of Spain (n.d.), with filtered datum from financial 
institutions that manage just over 85% of mortgage credit, there were 32,490 
mortgages foreclosures, of which 14,110 were payments (43% of the total) and another 
4,215 voluntary deliveries. When the judicial commission arrived to execute the eviction 
2,405 houses were still occupied and in 355 cases of judicial deliveries of occupied 
habitual houses the intervention of the police was required for the realization of the 
launch or eviction. The Bank of Spain underline that 85% of the mortgages that could 
not be paid in 2012 were contracted in 2007 or earlier, during the real estate bubble. 
On the other hand, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(Valero, 2015) disseminated through a report that, after the global crisis, poverty had 
increased in the countries of Southern Europe and, in the case of Spain, underline that 
a part of the poorest population had worsened their situation. Exactly in the case of 
Spain, the Gini coefficient, which measures income inequality within a country, has 
increased by 7.6 percentage points. The OECD also uses it to assess the inequality 
between incomes derived from household economic activities. This aspect, closely 
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related to the value of work, is where Spain moves away from the average more than 
any other country. 
In March of this year, the OECD (Gómez, 2017) again submitted a report which 
showed that in the economic recovery enjoyed by Spain, poverty has increased, mainly 
due to the lack of quality employment that provides sufficient hours of work and 
adequate income. 
Since 2008, according to the data handled by the Bank of Spain, households and 
companies have reduced their debts by half a trillion euros (approximately half of 
domestic GDP), which has led them to make one of the most important Europe to 
balance their finances. In this way, if the reduction of the last year is maintained, 
households will reach the eurozone level in 2018. Therefore, families would have to 
take out at least another 30,000 million more, to reduce their debt below 700,000 
millions of euros to end the process of deleveraging the private sector. 
 
Figure 8. Family debt 
 
Source: Evolution of debt in Spanish families, Idealista (2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
5.2 Uncertainty and mistrust 
The direct consequence suffered by retail customers has been the uncertainty of what 
will happen to their savings. A large number of retail customers invested in these  
products believing that they were making a safe investment, as confirmed in the 
contract. So, when they wanted to realize, their savings were immobilized due to the 
lack of liquidity linked to the product, or they were obliged to consolidate the debt. It 
should be noted that a significant portion of the customers who purchased this product 
were retired, who sought to make a return to their lifelong savings, or young people 
seeking to save money on their mortgage. On the other hand, the existence of 
irregularities in the commercialization of the product, was the sold of preferred 
participations to illiterates or people with Alzheimer‟s disease (Esteve, 2012). 
Figure 9. Fingerprint 
 
 
 
Source: Signature with the fingerprint of an illiterate person (El País, 2012) 
 
To have a general idea of  the trust level in the society, we are going to study the report 
presented by Edelman. In this way we will try to justify this loss of trust 
(Trustbarometer, 2015). 
Figure 10. Trust barometer 
 
Source: TrustBarometer, 2013 
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As we see in the before graph, Spain in 2014 was dominated by mistrust between 
society. Spain was above countries like Russia or Poland with 39 points. However, 
seems that in the year 2015 increased trust levels among the Spaniards, but without 
big changes, only 6 points. Another reason that I think interesting to highlight, is the 
result of the study in terms of trust in companies. In Spain, the reasons for lack of trust 
in companies are: 51% lack of economic growth, 47% does not help families to improve 
their quality of life, and 44% do not help the productivity of society. On the other hand, 
in terms of sectors, society is mistrust about financial services (54%), banking (53%) 
and the media (51%). 
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CHAPTER V: PREVENTIVE MEASURES 
In this chapter, are developed the actions developed by the competent bodies in the 
matter. 
4.1 MIFID (Market in Financial Instruments Directive) 
In 2008, after the increase in complex financial products to the retail customer, MiFID 
was born as the normative that harmonizes in Europe the regulation of the securities 
markets, the financial instruments traded in them, the organization and relationship with 
clients of financial institutions that provide investment services and investor protection 
that came into force on November 1, 2007 (CNMV, 2008). 
The main objectives of this directive are: to protect the customer so that he knows and 
understands the product which is going to buy, knows to assess the risk and makes the 
decision accordingly, regulate the behaviour of the financial institution and increase the 
competition between financial institutions. 
In order to ensure that institutions take appropriate measures to protect each type of 
investor, MiFID establishes the obligation to classify all clients of entities into two 
categories, professional and retail customer, and one additional to what it calls eligible 
counterparties . 
In the first place we find professional clients who are those who are presumed to have 
the experience and knowledge to understand and take on the risks involved in the 
investment services or financial products they wish to hire. Therefore, they are granted 
less protection and less information rights than a customer classified as a retailer. 
However, this classification gives the right, with an enunciative and non-limiting 
character to: 
-Right of information regarding the nature and risks of the financial instruments, 
execution centres of orders, incentives, expenses and costs associated with the 
contracting or the service rendered. 
- Right to know the Best Execution Policy, Conflict of Interest Policy, and Asset 
Safeguard Policy. 
- Right to have the contracts made with the entity, as well as the orders executed in its 
name by the entity appear in the corresponding records. 
In the other hand, the retail customers, the main customers of this work. They are the 
rest of the clients, and they enjoy the maximum level of protection in order that they 
can make informed decisions about their investments. Some of the rights are: 
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-Right to information related to financial instruments and investment strategies, order 
execution centers, associated costs and costs so as to enable them to understand the 
nature and risks of the investment service and the specific type of financial instrument 
which is offered. 
- Right to know the execution policy, the conflict of interest policy and the policy of 
safeguarding assets. 
- Right to have the contracts made, as well as executed orders, appear in the 
corresponding records. 
Finally we have the eligible counterparts. They are specialized clients who do not need 
any protection, given their knowledge and experience in the markets. This is the case 
for, for example, other financial institutions. 
4.2. CNMV 
The CNMV is the manager of the application of the rules of conduct of the entities in 
front of customers and over the last few years can be verified either through 
communications or through reports that have tried to regulate the sale of complex 
financial products to retail customers. The CNMV's Activity Plan (2012) establishes a 
series of specific objectives related to the sale of preference shares and subordinated 
debt: 
1. Strengthen the supervision of the liquidity mechanisms of fixed income issues to the 
retail customers (degree of compliance with the liquidity commitments and the 
transparency of the platforms). 
2. Maintain thorough supervision of the marketing practices of these products. 
3. Issue recommendations for the improvement of the valuation reports that 
accompany the emissions directed to the retail customers. In any case, the CNMV will 
reiterate in its publications and appearances the need for investors to be properly 
informed, through the documentation offered by the issuing entity and the CNMV, on 
the nature and risks of the products, before finalizing its investment decision. 
4.3 Spanish Government 
The malaise of the Spanish population with the current mortgage situation is due to a 
deficient regulation of the same by the financial institutions as by the successive 
governments that have gone through the power in the last years. In recent years, due 
to the worrying statistics on the subject of evictions by financial institutions and the 
numerous mobilizations that Spanish society has carried out, it seems clear that need a 
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very important change. This has led to the start of trying to find a solution to this 
problem. It is evident that in the midst of the scandals of the ground clauses and the 
payment of expenses related to loans for the purchase of housing, the Government is 
working on a new law that regulates all the fronts that so many headaches are 
provoking to the financial entities, in order to provide greater juridical security to the 
mortgage system and protect the citizen (Anton, 2017). 
With this regulation, the Government wants to underpin all the concepts referring to 
mortgage loans susceptible of diffuse interpretations, such as the different clauses that 
can be considered abusive, the commercialization of swaps, multi-currency mortgages 
or the responsibility that at any given time can be attributed to notaries or property 
registrars. 
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CONCLUSION 
After read and analysed the information to do this paper, I can‟t get over it. Entities 
have introduced highly complex products and clauses among retail customers. As a 
future graduate in Finance and Accounting, I am surprised at how banks sold this type 
of product to people who have no knowledge of financial and economic markets, not 
obey with the legal obligation to safeguard the interests of consumers, and abandoned 
them in the complexity and volatility of the markets, making them unknowingly 
assuming risks of large investment funds and financial experts. I have noticed that 
there is some toxicity in the financial framework, mainly encouraged by financial 
institutions. 
According to the Collins dictionary (2017) a bank " an institution offering certain 
financial services, such as the safekeeping of money, conversion of domestic into and 
from foreign currencies, lending of money at interest, and acceptance of bills of 
exchange." From my point of view, it is that as a company which the main objective is 
to maximize profits, reason why the others as social welfare, are in the background. 
The bank will do all  to achieve its goals, which is why I believe that they allow your 
mortgage trade in the stock market, a pensioner without financial knowledge has 
derivatives, finance production of weapons (SETEM, 2011),  speculate with food 
(FoEE, 2012) or placing abusive terms in contracts. In general, they do irresponsible 
and uncontrolled activities, in a non-transparent way. 
Thus, as we have seen, most judgments coincide in one concept: lack of transparency. 
This characteristic is one of the theoretical necessary conditions for a free market 
policy to be efficient. 
As the author Pertiñez Vilchez (2013: 5) explains, the lack of transparency occurs 
"when the financial institution does not inform sufficiently the characteristics or 
existence of a product or clause before the conclusion of the contract and its 
consequences in case of a foreseeable downgrade scenario of the reference rate, its 
inclusion in the contract, which causes the surreptitious alteration of the credit price, on 
which the borrower believed to have given his consent from the information provided by 
the entity in the pre-contractual stage.” 
Therefore, transparency ensures, in relation to the main purpose of the contract, that 
the consumer is aware of the economic burden arising from the contract and the 
benefits that the other party will receive. In short, what is intended is that the customer, 
has the possibility, certain and immediately to compare different offers and options that 
exist in the market for the contracting of a financial product. In summary, the lack of 
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transparency in certain actions, the perversion of financial products that were targeted 
to inappropriate segments, misleading advertising, lack of information (when not 
deceiving) to shareholders and regulators ..., all this leads clearly to induce a lack of 
ethics in the performance of organizations, with a significant negative impact on their 
credibility and trust. 
Finally, as students and future professionals in the financial sector, it is our 
responsibility to eliminate the toxicity that has proliferated in recent years in the 
financial framework, controlling, supervising and acting from the most ethical, 
responsible point of view and solidarity. 
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